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Abstract. There is a basic distinction, in the realm of spatial boundaries, between bona
fide boundaries on the one hand, and fiat boundaries on the other. The former are just the
physical boundaries of old. The latter are exemplified especially by boundaries induced
through human demarcation, for example in the geographic domain. The classical prob-
lems connected with the notions of adjacency, contact, separation and division can be re-
solved in an intuitive way by recognizing this two-sorted ontology of boundaries. Bona
fide boundaries yield a notion of contact that is effectively modeled by classical topology;
the analogue of contact involving fiat boundaries calls, however, for a different account,
based on the intuition that fiat boundaries do not support the open/closed distinction on
which classical topology is based. In the presence of this two-sorted ontology it then tran-
spires that mereotopology—topology erected on a mereological basis—is more than a
trivial formal variant of classical point-set topology.
1. Parts and Boundaries
Consider John, the moon, a lump of cheese. These are objects possessed of
divisible bulk. They can be divided, in reality or in thought, into spatially ex-
tended parts. They have interiors. They also have boundaries, which we can
think of (roughly) as infinitely thin extremal slices. The boundary of
the moon is the lunar surface. The boundary of John is the surface of his
skin.
But what of inner boundaries, the boundaries of the interior parts of
things? There are many genuine two-dimensional (sphere- nd torus-like)
boundaries within the interior of John’s body in virtue of the differentiation
of this body into organs, cells, and so on. Imagine, however, a spherical ball
made of some perfectly homogeneous prime matter. If the possession by
2an object of genuine inner boundaries presupposes either some interior spa-
tial discontinuity or qualitative heterogeneity, then there is a sense in which
there are no boundaries to be acknowledged within the interior of such an
object at all.
Yet we do sometimes speak of inner boundaries even in the absence of
any corresponding physical discontinuity or qualitative differentiation. Even
in relation to a homogeneous sphere we can still talk sensibly of its upper
and lower hemispheres, its center of mass, and so on. We shall call the inner
boundaries involved in such cases fiat boundaries. Inner boundaries involv-
ing spatial discontinuity (holes, fissures, slits) or qualitative heterogeneity (of
material constitution, texture, electric charge) we shall call bona fidebound-
aries.1
1.1. Fiat Boundaries and Fiat Objects
The distinction between fiat and bona fide boundaries applies not only to
inner boundaries but to outer boundaries, too. The surfaces of extended ob-
jects such as planets or tennis balls are of the bona fide sort. National bor-
ders, by contrast, as well as county- and property-lines and the borders of
postal and electoral districts, provide examples of outer boundaries of the fiat
sort, at least in those cases where they lie skew to any qualitative differ-
entiations or spatial discontinuities (coastlines, rivers) in the underlying
territory.
There are different types of fiat boundaries. Thus there are fiat bounda-
ries in the social world—such as those drawn by real estate developers or by
international boundary commissions—which can be compared to claims, ob-
ligations, and other sorts of social object. They have a quasi-abstract charac-
ter in the sense that they are relatively isolated from causal change. But they
are not completely isolated: there is standardly a point in time at which they
begin to exist, and while they exist they may be associated with specific sys-
tems of legal or other sorts of sanctions. Further, they manifest a type of ge-
neric dependence upon associated beliefs and customs on the part of relevant
                                                
1 This terminology was introduced in Smith 1994a. See Smith 1995a and Varzi
1997 for some first applications.
3human beings, so that they may be sustained in being from generation to
generation.
There are also non-social fiat boundaries. Consider, for example, the
boundaries depicted in atlases of surgical anatomy (between the upper, mid-
dle, and lower femur). Fiat boundaries are involved, too, when an individual
cognitive agent conceptualizes a sphere as being made of two hemispheres or
when a school boy draws a circle on a blackboard. And we shall see below
that fiat boundaries are involved also in perception. Individual fiats are much
more ephemeral than social fiats because they are individually dependent (on
these acts, taking place now) rather than generically dependent (on the exis-
tence of relevant acts of a certain kind).
There are also fiat boundaries that have a mathematical definition, such
as the equator or the center of mass of the moon. In such cases, the question
of their ontological status is part-and-parcel of the larger question of the ex-
istence and status of mathematical entities in reality.
But now, once fiat boundaries have been recognized, it becomes clear
that the bona fide–fiat opposition can be drawn not merely in relation to
boundaries but in relation to objects also. Examples of bona fide objects are:
John, the moon, a lump of cheese. Examples of fiat objects are: Dade
County, the State of Wyoming, the North Sea (whose objectivity, as Frege
writes (1884, §26), ‘is not affected by the fact that it is a matter of our arbi-
trary choice which part of all the water on the earth’s surface we mark off
and elect to call the “North Sea”’).
Broadly, it is the drawing of fiat outer boundaries in the spatial realm
which yields fiat objects. We say broadly, since there are cases of objects
which ought reasonably to be classified as fiat objects whose boundaries
involve a mixture of bona fide and fiat elements. The shores of the North Sea
are bona fide boundaries; but we conceive the North Sea as a fiat object
nonetheless, because where it abuts the Atlantic it has a boundary of a non-
bona fide sort. Moreover, there are normally perfectly good reasons—
reasons of topography, economy, or military strategy—why these and those
fiat objects are created rather than others. Fiat objects thus owe their exis-
tence not exclusively to human fiat: real properties of the underlying factual
material are involved also. These both enable the drawing of fiat borders and
constrain the types and location of fiat borders which can be drawn.
4Nor are there only two-dimensional fiat objects correlated with selected
regions on the surface of the globe. Examples of three-dimensional fiat ob-
jects are provided by the subterranean volumes of land to which mineral
rights have been assigned, and also by the sectors and corridors in space es-
tablished for the purposes of air traffic control. These may be quite compli-
cated three-dimensional worms; they may intersect each other and they may
have holes. Moreover, insofar as an object whose boundary is not entirely of
the bona fide variety counts as a fiat object, many ordinary entities will also
qualify as three-dimensional fiat objects. A mountain, a bay, the branches of
a tree, or the stem of a champagne glass are all fiat objects in this sense.
Finally, all the examples of fiat objects mentioned so far are cases where
proper parts are delineated or carved out by fiat on the surfaces or within the
interiors of larger bona fide wholes. However, while we can reasonably as-
sume that all bona fide objects are connected, fiat objects may be scattered, as
in the case of Polynesia, the Polish nobility, the constellation Orion. Fol-
lowing Meinong (1899), we might refer to such entities as ‘higher-order’
(fiat) objects. Objects of this sort may themselves be unified together into
further fiat objects (say: the Union of Pacific Island Nations). The fiat
boundaries to which higher-order fiat objec s owe their existence are the
mereological sums of the (fiat and bona fide) outer boundaries of their re-
spective lower-order constituents.
1.2. Boundaries and Cognition
One reason for resisting scepticism in face of the fiat world turns on the fact
that people kill each other over fiat borders, and they give their lives to defend
them. Even in times of peace there are entire industries (of real estate law,
cadastral registration, land surveying) which are devoted to their maintenance.
But are the geographical and political examples upon which our remarks
have been concentrated so far truly of central ontological importance? Here
we shall content ourselves with considering what might be the justification
for awarding the categories of fiat boundaries and fiat objects a crucial or-
ganizing role in our categorial scheme.
To grasp the theoretical significance of the examples mentioned thus
far, we must consider certain topological peculiarities of fiat boundaries.
5Consider what happens when two political entities (nations, states, coun-
ties) lie adjacent to one another. The entities in question may be said to share
a common boundary (border). This sharing or coincidence of spatial
boundaries is, we want to claim, a peculiarity of the fiat world: it has no ana-
logue in the world of bona fide entities. To see this, it may suffice to imag-
ine that two bodies, say John and Mary, should converge upon each other
for a period of time, for example in shaking hands or kissing. Physically
speaking, as we know, a complicated story has to be told in such cases as to
what happens in the area of apparent contact of the two bodies, a story in
terms of sub-atomic particles whose location and whose belongingness to
either one or the other of the two bodies may be only statistically specifiable.
As far as bona fide outer boundaries are concerned, however, no genuine
contact or coincidence of boundaries between John and Mary is possible
at all. Certainly every genuine kiss involves real physical phenomena (relat-
ing to surface tension, fluid exchange, compacting of molecules) as well
as associated real psychological phenomena (of tactile andemotional feel-
ing, etc.). But these are merely such as to provide an appropriate real ba-
sis for the sorts of fiat demarcations which are effected when we use the
simple terms of natural language to describe the relevant larger-scale phe-
nomena.
We apprehend the world as consisting of (fleets of) ships, (pairs of)
shoes and (ounces of) sealing wax, and in each case fiat boundaries are at
work in articulating the reality with which we have to deal. Natural language
contributes to the generation of fiat boundaries also through the opposition
between mass nouns (such as ‘water’) and count nouns (such as ‘person’).
A hungry carnivore points towards the cattlefield and pronounces ‘There is
cow over there’. How does this pronouncement differ, in its object, from
‘There are cows over there’? Not, certainly, in the underlying real bovine
material. Rather, it differs in virtue of the different sorts of boundary that are
imposed upon this material in the two cases.
In fact, our cognition of external reality involves the systematic imposi-
tion of boundaries of many different sorts, including fiat boundaries which
may be more or less ephemeral.2 One important motor for the drawing of
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6ephemeral fiat boundaries is perception, which as we know from our experi-
ence of Seurat paintings has the function of articulating reality in terms of
sharp boundaries even when such boundaries are not genuinely present in
the autonomous (which is to say mind-independent) physical world. Holes,
dents, bumps and protrusions are also to be counted as fiat objects in this
sense. Consider the Grand Canyon. That part of its boundary which serves
as (virtual) lid, separating it from the body of air above it, is a fiat boundary:
it corresponds to no physical discontinuity.3
We have thus far been leaving out of account borders commonly con-
ceptualized in terms of zones rather than of abstract geometrical lines— ob-
jects of the types depicted for example on weather maps. Here, too, the no-
tion of fiat boundary can be brought into play. Consider, for example, de-
serts, valleys, dunes, clouds. Such objects seem to be delineated not by crisp
outer boundaries but by imprecise, boundary-like regions. This should not,
however, be taken to imply that the underlying reality is in some respects ul-
timately vague—that we should allow for a distinction between crisp and
genuinely scruffy (fuzzy, hazy, indeterminate) denizens of reality, as some
have urged.4 Rather, vagueness is a conceptual and semantic matter that per-
tains ontologically only to the fiat world. If you point to an irregularly
shaped protuberance in the sand and say ‘dune’, then the correlate of your
expression is a fiat object whose constituent unitary parts are comprehended
(articulated) through the concept dune. The vagueness of the concept is re-
sponsible for the way in which the referent of your expression is picked out.
Likewise, when you baptize a piece of land ‘Mount Everest’, the referent of
the term is vaguely fixed, and in this sense Mount Everest is a vague fiat ob-
ject. But no part or feature of bona fide reality is in and of itself vague. Each
one of a large variety of slightly distinct aggregates of molecules has an
equal claim to being the referent of your newly introduced name. And each
such aggregate is precisely determinate.5
                                                
common-sense world of the sort set out in Hobbs and Moore 1985, and it supplements
Stroll 1988. See Smith 1995b for a general survey.
3 See Varzi 1996b. See also Smith and Varzi, forthcoming, for applications of this
idea to the formal ontology of niches and environmental settings.
4 See for instance Tye 1990.
5 Thus Quine 1985, pp. 167–68.
72. Problems of Contact and Separation
A fundamental question arises as soon as boundaries are taken seriously into
account. A boundary demarcates two entities, or two parts of the same entity,
which are then said to be in contact with each other. How is this relation of
contact to be explained?
We have seen that as far as bona fide outer boundaries are concerned,
our everyday intuitions on these matters are in need of revision. For both
physical and mathematical reasons, the surfaces of distinct physical bodies
cannot be in contact, though two bodies may of course be so close to each
other that they appear to be in contact to the naked eye. (This is why natural
language does not distinguish between true topological contact—or connec-
tion, as we may also say—and mere physical closeness.) Yet we wish, surely,
to hold on to the idea that there is genuine contact between John’s head and
the rest of his body. And this may seem to cause problems. Shall we say,
following Bolzano (1851), that contact is only possible if one of these two
entities (the head or the rest of the body) lacks a boundary of its own? Or
shall we rather follow Brentano (1976) and maintain that there are here two
boundaries (one belonging to the head and one to the body) which share ex-
actly the same location?
Imagine ourselves proceeding along a line through the middle of a disk
that is divided into two precisely symmetrical regions. What happens as we
pass the boundary between the two? Do we pass through a last point x in the
first and a first point y in the second? Clearly not, given the density of the
continuum; for then we should have to admit an indefinite number of further
points between x and y which would somehow be in neither region. To ac-
knowledge the existence of just one of xa dy but not the other, however, as
is dictated by the standard mathematical treatment of the continuum, would
be to countenance a peculiar privileging of one of the two regions over the
other, and such an unmotivated asymmetry can surely be rejected as a contra-
vention of the principle of sufficient reason.
The difficulty in providing satisfactory answers to such questions has
served to impugn the realist attitude towards boundaries quite generally, and
these have accordingly been assigned to almost total oblivion in the history
of metaphysics. Here, however, we shall argue that this is a mistake stem-
8ming precisely from the failure to appreciate the distinction between fiat and
bona fide boundaries.
2.1. The Open/Closed Opposition
A more precise statement of the standard argument against a realist ontology
of boundaries is as follows: (1) Admitting boundaries implies a distinction
between closed and open entities—i.e., between entities that do and entities
that do not include their boundaries among their constituent parts.6 But (2)
the open/closed distinction is in this respect counterintuitive: it seems to im-
ply that, if a body is divided in half, then we must be left with one part that is
closed and another that is open. Thus (3) we must do without boundaries
(and without the open/closed distinction) and regard talk of boundaries as a
mere façon de parler about other things—for example about infinite series.7
We shall object to both premisses of this argument. First, premiss (1)
corresponds to the assumption that an ontology of boundaries must be based
on ordinary topology. We shall argue that this assumption is indeed correct
for bona fide boundaries. However, fiat boundaries—and the analogue of
contact which they involve—call for a different sort of topology which dis-
penses with the open/closed distinction. Where fiat boundaries are present,
even if only as segments of larger boundaries which include also bona fide
portions, the usual trichotomy: open, closed, partly-open-and-partly-closed,
does not apply.
Second, the open/closed distinction is not in and of itself counterintui-
tive. Indeed, in some cases it seems quite reasonable: ordinary material ob-
jects are naturally the owners of their boundaries (their surfaces, in effect),
and there is nothing counterintuitive in the thought that the environments in
which objects are embedded are open.8 Thus, premiss (2) is also ill-
grounded.
                                                
6 An entity may include parts of its boundary, but not the whole, and thereby qual-
ify as partly closed and partly open. In the following we shall ignore the complications
that arise in such cases and speak of partly open objects as being open simpliciter.
7 This argument is rooted in the work of Whitehead 1929 and is exemplified in the
recent literature by Gotts et al. 1996. For a suey of related positions see Varzi 1997.
8 On the idea that material objects have open complements, see also Asher and
9Consider, however, the alleged difficulty with the phenomenon of sepa-
ration (the mirror image of the phenomenon of contact). Suppose we dissect
a solid sphere. This creates two half-spheres. Is one closed and the other
open? This very question arises, we insist, only on the basis of an incorrect
model of what happens topologically when a process of cutting takes place.9
Such a process does not reveal additional surfaces which have been trapped,
as it were, inside the sphere until the cutting took place. Rather, the extant
outer surface of the sphere is progressively deformed. Think of a splitting oil
drop. The drop grows longer and, as it grows, the middle part shrinks and
gets thinner and thinner. Eventually the right and left portions split and we
have two drops, each with its own complete boundary. A long, continuous
process suddenly results in an abrupt topological change. There was one
drop; now there are two. And so in the case of the dissected sphere. There
was one surface, and now there are two.
This account reduces the problem of cutting to that of separating two
spheres that are connected by one tiny point. But does this really solve the
problem? Where does this one point belong—to the left sphere or the right
one? There is indeed something deeply problematic about the point of sepa-
ration. However, this is true of every topological change. Consider:
1) Two drops of oil move toward each other until they come into con-
tact. An abrupt change takes place: the topology of the overall configuration
is suddenly altered. Two surfaces merge. Two drops become one.
2) A worm drills a hole in a log of wood and breaks through to the
other side. Once again, an abrupt change takes place at the termination of
such a process: a sphere becomes a doughnut; the topology of the object
undergoes a qualitative transformation. Or consider a piece of soft plasticine
(a mushy blob) through which you make a perforation by slowly pressing
your finger: there then occurs a constant elastic deformation which
terminates when your finger—mirabile dictu—breaks through to the other
side.
                                                
Vieu 1995 and Smith and Varzi, forthcoming. Casati and Varzi 1994 argue that holes, in
particular, are bounded from the outside: the boundary of a hole is the surface of its mate-
rial host. For other families of examples see Jackendoff 1991.
9 This point expands on an argument put forward in Varzi 1997, §7.
10
3) A bed of coral starts growing a “finger” somewhere. The finger
continues to grow until it eventually comes round to meet the main body
again, forming a sort of handle. At the instant that it does so, the topology of
the object changes: where once we had a sphere, now we have a torus.
All these cases involve something genuinely problematic. But this re-
flects only the fact that topological change marks one point at which common
sense reaches the limits of its theoretical competence, and we can of course
provide accounts of these same phenomena also from the perspective of
physical science. We then discover that macroscopic physical objects are not
continuous and that they do not have boundaries of the sort countenanced by
common sense at all. When we move to adopt the physical perspective, then
our topological problems disappear. You make a tunnel by removing the last
layer of molecules or by augmenting their relative distance (and whe you
start having a tunnel may well be a vague matter). You split two things when
you pull apart the last two molecules or atoms in such a way as to create a
gulf between them. No mystery remains. But what follows from this? Not
that we should give up talk of macroscopic boundaries altogether; for what-
ever is to be said about the ontology of the physical world, one still needs
such talk when it comes to the fiat entities carved out by ordinary discourse
and to the spatial regions which these occupy.
2.2. Coincidence of Fiat Boundaries
As long as we confine ourselves to a topological model, then, cutting a solid
object does not bring surfaces to light. Thus the demarcation puzzle—the
puzzle of providing a principled way of determining, when a body is divided
in half, which half is open and which is closed—does not arise, a d his
blocks the argument against bona fide boundaries. However, suppose we do
not actually cut the object. Suppose we simply conceptualize a fiat boundary
separating it into two halves. Is this not enough to give rise to the demarca-
tion puzzle? Which half gets to own the boundary? To which hemisphere
does the equator belong? Or think of the Mason–Dixon line separating
Maryland and Pennsylvania. There is no fact of the matter that can support
the ownership of a border such as this by one piece of land rather than an-
other. Yet we cannot simply say that the borders are unowned: the States of
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the Union use up the whole territory—no boundaries can be l ft as thin
slices between them.
It is here that the peculiarity of fiat boundaries comes into play. Fiat
boundaries do not introduce any physical discontinuity. But nor arethey
merely potential entities: it is not that they can come to constitute a disconti-
nuity by having their status changed from fiat to bona fide. Certainly it may
be possible, where one has a fiat boundary in a physical object, to generate a
bona fide boundary in the corresponding place, e.g., by cutting. But as we
have seen, the fiat boundary does not then become a bona fide boundary: no
pre-existent inner surface is brought to light by a process of cutting. Like-
wise, some national borders will in course of time come to involve boundary-
markers (barbed wire fences and the like) which will tend in cumulation to
replace what is initially a pure fiat boundary with something more substan-
tial. But this is not a process of transformation. The categorial distinction
between fiat and bona fide boundaries is absolute.
How, then, do we account for the ownership of fiat boundaries as
such? Does the equator belong to the Northern or to the Southern hemi-
sphere? Our answer—in fact the only answer which remains as a possible
option—is that it belongs to both. Or, more precisely, each hemisphere has
its own equator, and the two equators coincide (i.e., they have the same spa-
tial location).
This suggestion draws on Brentano. As pointed out by Chisholm,
topological connection is to be explained, for Brentano, not via the open/
closed opposition, but in terms of boundary coincidence.10 Brentano in fact
regards the possibility of coincidence as a distinguishing feature of all
boundaries. However, we do not need to embrace this view as a general the-
ory of boundaries, for we have seen that the demarcation puzzle is nota
problem when the demarcation involved is due to a genuine qualitative dis-
continuity (a bona fide boundary). Rather, we want to regard Brentano’s the-
ory as a theory of what goes on when objects or their parts are separated
merely by fiat. It is here that coincidence relations become relevant. We can
                                                
10 See Brentano 1976, p. 41; see also Brentano 1924, pp. 357f. Brentano’s theory
of the continuum has been examined by Roderick Chisholm in a number of papers; see
especially 1984, 1992/3. Smith 1997 provides a detailed formal theory.
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speak of the Mason–Dixon line as the border between Maryland and Penn-
sylvania. But this single border is to be recognized as being made up of two
parts, two perfectly coinciding fiat boundaries bounding Maryland and Penn-
sylvania, respectively.
One derivative advantage of this doubling up is that it also yields the
possibility of admitting asymmetric boundaries, boundaries which bound
their objects in certain directions only and not in others. This is the case
where only one of the two potentially co-located fiat boundaries is actually
present as, for example, at the old border between the German Democratic
and Federal Republics.
3. Towards a Formal Theory
We thus have two complementary boundary theories. The first, more classi-
cal theory, holds that genuine contact is only possible between two entities
one of which is open in the contact area and the other closed. The second
yields a quite new form of topology. It turns on the contrary insight, accord-
ing to which what is characteristic of a continuum is the possibility of a coin-
cidence of boundaries. The two theories are not in complete disagreement.
Both bona fide and fiat boundaries share a fundamental property: they are
ontologically parasitic on (i.e., cannot exist in isolation from) their hosts, the
entities they bound. This is a common feature that a comprehensive treatment
of boundary phenomena should emphasize. In providing a more precise
formulation of the two theories, we shall therefore start with their common
core and then move on to the two needed supplements.
3.1. The Common Core
The fundamental ontological property of boundaries was given a clear for-
mulation by Brentano himself (who in turn elaborated on Aristotle’s sketchy
remarks in the Physics and the Metaphysics): if something continuous is a
mere boundary, then it can never exist except in connection with other
boundaries and except as belonging to a continuum of higher dimension.11
                                                
11 See Brentano 1976, Part I.
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There are, in reality, no isolated points, lines, or surfaces. Bound ries are, in
Chisholm’s terms, dependent particulars. They are in this respect comparable
to universal forms or abstract structures (for example to the structure of a
molecule which exists only as belonging to a given concrete instance). This
must be said of all boundaries, including those which possess no dimension
at all, such as spatial points: a cutting free from everything that is continuous
and extended is for them, too, impossible.
Dependent or parasitic entities license certain sorts of ontological infer-
ence (if there is a boundary/structure/universal having these and those prop-
erties, then there is a host having these and those properties). We cannot in-
fer to any specific host, however. Thus it cannot be said of any definite con-
tinuum that a boundary is dependent on it. That which a boundary is depend-
ent on can be designated rather only via a general term: what is required by a
boundary is, Brentano says, “not this or that particular continuum, but any
continuum of the appropriate kind” (1933, p. 56; translation corrected). For
while no boundary can exist without being connected with a continuum,
“there is no specifiable part, however small, of the continuum, and no point,
however near it may be to the boundary, which is such that we may say that it
is the existence of that part or of that point which conditions the boundary.”
(Ibid.) In short, the continuum is specifically dependent on its boundary, but
the boundary is not in this same sense dependent on its continuum; it is only
generically so.12
It is impossible to do justice to these distinctions without resorting in
some way to modal notions. However, we shall attempt in what follows to
embed the dependent nature of boundaries at least into a basic non-modal
mereological (more generally, mereotopological) framework. Our aim will be
illustrative, so we shall not be too concerned with the question of what sort of
formal mereological theory is most adequate for this purpose. We shall,
however, try to be rather specific as concerns the question of how such a
mereological background can be integrated with a theory of boundaries of
the bona fide and fiat sorts.13
                                                
12 On boundaries as dependent particulars see Chisholm 1984. See Smith 1992,
§10, for further discussion of the generic dependence of boundaries upon their hosts.
13 Further formal details are provided in Smith 1993, 1997 and Varzi 1996a, 1997.
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3.2. Mereology
Mereology is the formal theory of part-relations: of the relations of part to
whole and the relations of part to part within a whole. For simplicity, we
shall assume a standard mereological pparatus constructed around the
primitive is part of, which we symbolize as ‘£’.14 (We take ‘x £ y’ to be
true when x is any sort of part of y, including an improper part, so that x £ y
will be consistent with x’s being the same as y.) If we define overlap in the
usual way:
D£1 O(x, y) := $z(z £ x Ù  z £ y), 
then the axioms for this mereological background can be formulated as fol-
lows:15
A£1 x £ x
A£2 x £ y Ù  y £ x fi  x = y
A£3 x £ y Ù  y £ z fi  x £ z
A£4 " z(z £ x fi O(z, y)) fi  x £ y 
A£5 $x(f x) fi  $y" z(O(y, z) «  $x(f x Ù  O(x, z))).
Thus, parthood is a reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive relation, a partial
ordering. In addition, A£4 ensures that parthood is extensional, whereas the
schema A£5 guarantees that for every satisfied property or condition f  (i.e.,
every condition f  that is true of at least one object) there exists an entity, the
sum or fusion, consisting precisely of all the f ers. This entity will be denoted
by ‘sx(f x)’ and is defined as follows:16
D£2 sx(f x) := iy" z(O(y, z) «  $x(f x Ù  O(x, z))).
                                                
14 For an introduction to standard mereology and its variants, see Simons 1987.
15 Here and in the sequel initial universal quantifiers are to be taken as understood,
and variables are to be conceived as ranging over all spatial entities, both extended and
non-extended. Moreover, our axioms are to be read synchronically: thus, A£5 is to guaran-
tee the existence of a fusion of all entities that satisfy f  t any given time t, but not the
cross-temporal fusion of all entities that satisfy f  at some time or other.
16 We assume the definite descriptor ‘i ’ to be contextually defined in standard Rus-
sellian fashion.
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With the help of this operator, other useful notions are easily defined. In
particular, we can define the operators of mereological sum (+), product (´ ),
and complement (–):
D£ 3 x+y :=s z (z £  x Ú  z £  y)
D£ 4 x´ y :=s z (z £  x Ù  z £  y)
D£ 5 –x :=s z (Ø O(z, x))
3.3. The Theory of Bona Fide Boundaries
Let us now proceed to the formulation of the basic principles for boundaries.
We shall begin with the theory of bona fide boundaries, which effectively
corresponds to an ontology based on ordinary, Bolzanian topology; we shall
then move on to the Brentanian theory for fiat boundaries.
We symbolize the primitive boundary relation by ‘B’, reading ‘B(x, y)’
as “x is a bona fide boundary for y”. We say boundary for rather than of to
allow for boundaries that are not maximal (edges, corners, parts of surfaces).
The notion of a maximal bona fide boundary of x is then immediately de-
fined, using A£ 5, as the sum of all bona fide boundaries for x:
DB1 b(x) := s z (B(z, x)).
Of course, this is a partial operator that may not be defined for all values of
‘x’. For instance, if x is the State of Wyoming, it has no bona fide bounda-
ries and b(x) is undefined. Likewise, an arbitrary cube within the interior of a
homogeneous sphere has no maximal boundary in the sense of DB1.
Let us now define the (partial) operator for topological closure n the
obvious way:
DB2 c(x) := x+b(x), 
Then the basic postulates for a topology based on bona fide boundaries can
be given by mereologizing the standard Kuratowski axioms for closure op-
erators:17
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arguments. See Smith 1993 and Pianesi and Varzi 1996 for alternative axiomatizations.
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AB1 x £  c(x)
AB2 c(c(x)) £  c(x)
AB3 c(x+y) = c(x) + c(y).
(In view of DB2, axiom AB1 is actually derivable from A£ 1 and £ 3.)
This yields a straightforward reformulation of much of standard topo-
logy based on extensional mereology instead of set theory. In particular, it
implies that bona fide boundaries are always transitive and dissective:
TB1 B(x, y) Ù  B(y, z) ®  B(x, z)
TB2 x £  y Ù  B(y, z) ®  B(x, z).
They are also symmetric, in the sense that a bona fide boundary for a given
entity is also a bona fide boundary for that entity’s complement:
TB3 B(x, y) ®  B(x, –y).
The symmetry of ‘B’ allows us to define the relation of (bona fide) connec-
tion as the sharing of a common part or boundary, in the following sense:
DB3 C(x, y) := O(x, y) Ú  O(c(x), y) Ú  O(x, c(y)).
Accordingly, if we define contact as external connection, i.e., connection
without overlap:
DB4 EC(x, y) := C(x, y) Ù  Ø O(x, y),
and if we define closed entities in the obvious way,
DB5 Cl(x) := x = c(x),
then we can immediately infer from the above that two entities can be in con-
tact only if one of them is not closed:
TB4 EC(x, y) ®  (Cl(x) ®  Ø Cl(y)).
Thus, contact between John and Mary is simply not possible if this is under-
stood in terms of external connection. This is in agreement with physics and
with ordinary topology. In addition, however, it also follows that, so long as
we have at our disposal only the notion of bona fide contact, John’s (unde-
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tached) head is not in contact with John’s body—for there is no bona fide
boundary connecting these two respective parts. This marks the point where
we need to depart from ordinary topology and move to an account in terms
of fiat boundaries.
Reference to fiat boundaries will also be needed to capture the idea that
bona fide boundaries are dependent particulars. This thesis—which stands
opposed to the set-theoretic conception of boundaries as, effectively, sets of
independent points, each one of which could exist though all around it be
annihilated—has a number of possible interpretations.18 One general state-
ment of the dependence thesis would assert that the existence of any bound-
ary is such as to imply the existence of some entity of higher dimension
which it bounds. Here, though, we must content ourselves with the formula-
tion of a simpler thesis to the effect that every boundary is such that we can
find an entity which it bounds and which is not itself a boundary (i.e., which
has an interior). To this end, we may define the relational predicate of inte-
rior parthood:
DB6 IP(x, y) := x £  y Ù  " z(B(z, y) ® Ø O(x, z)).
Obviously, boundaries have no interior parts:
TB5 B(x, y) ®  Ø IP(z, x).
We define also, f r convenience, a monadic predicate of bona fide boundary:
DB7 Bd(x) := $ yB(x, y).
We could then provide a first formulation of the dependence thesis for bona
fide boundaries:
AB4 Bd(x) ®  $ y$ z(B(x, y) Ù  IP(z, y)).
This is not very strong, however. For as it turns out, AB4 is always trivially
satisfied by choosing z open (i.e., such that IP(z, z)) and setting y equal to the
scattered object x+z. A dependence thesis of the required strength must
therefore impose on y i AB4 at least the additional requirement of being
                                                
18 See Smith 1997 for an extended treatment.
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self-connected (being all of a piece). To express this requirement, however, 
we need to have at our disposal the resources of a topology of fiat
boundaries.
3.4. The Theory of Fiat Boundaries
Let us use ‘B*’ as a primitive for fiat boundaries, reading ‘B*(x, y)’ as “x is
a fiat boundary for y”. A bona fide boundary for y is in every case also a
boundary for the complement of y (TB3), though it belongs as part only to
one or the other of these. In contrast, the main distinguishing feature of fiat
boundaries is that they are necessarily parts of the entities they bound. A fiat
boundary for y is in every case a part of y: this is the first axiom for ‘B*’:
AB*1 B*(x, y) ®  x £  y.
Note that parthood, here, embraces not merely physical but also social ob-
jects. When, in 1922, the British High Commissioner Sir Percy Cox drew
lines on a map marking the boundaries of Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, he
thereby added new non-physical ingredients to the world.
It follows from AB*1 that there is no significant analogue of the clo-
sure operator ‘c’ in the fiat world: the sum of an object with its fiat bounda-
ries is in every case just the object itself. There is therefore no significant
counterpart to the Kuratowski axioms in the theory of fiat boundaries. It also
follows from AB*1 that ‘B*’ does not satisfy the analogue of TB3: fiat
boundaries are not symmetric (and so we might, in certain circumstances, talk
of “oriented boundaries”). However, we can assume dissectivity (the ana-
logue of TB2):
AB*2 x £  y Ù  B*(y, z) ®  B*(x, z).
whence transitivity (the analogue of TB1) follows immediately:
TB*1 B*(x, y) Ù  B*(y, z) ®  B*(x, z).
Thus, by AB*2 every linear segment of the border of Wyoming is a fiat
boundary for Wyoming; and by TB*1 any point serving as a boundary of a
segment of the border of Wyoming is a boundary point for Wyoming itself.
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We can also formulate the fiat analogue of our rudimentary version of
the dependence thesis expressed by AB4. To this end, let us define the fiat
analogues of the predicates ‘Bd’ and ‘IP’ introduced in DB6 and DB7:
DB*1 IP*(x, y) := x £  y Ù  " z(B*(z, y) ® Ø O(x, z)).
DB*2 Bd*(x) := $ yB*(x, y).
Clearly, we must assume the analogue of TB5: fiat boundaries are bounda-
ries; hence they have no (fiat) interior parts:
AB*3 B*(x, y) ®  Ø IP*(z, x).
Then the fiat counterpart of AB4 becomes:
AB*4 Bd*(x) ®  $ y$ z(B*(x, y) Ù  IP*(z, y)).
We shall see shortly how this thesis can be strengthened to avoid the sort of
trivialization already mentioned in connection with AB4.
In order now to characterize the relation between John’s head and
John’s body (the relation of connection by fiat boundary), we rely on the
relation of coincidence, which we symbolize by ‘» ’. This relation is to be
understood intuitively as obtaining between two entities x and y just in case
they share the same spatial location. We shall assume here that material ob-
jects cannot coincide in this sense with other material objects. But fiat
boundaries, because they are not possessed of divisible bulk, do not occupy
(fill out) the space where they are located; hence they can be perfectly co-
located one with another.19
On this interpretation, coincidence is clearly an equivalence relation, i.e.,
a reflexive, symmetric, and transitive relation:20
A» 1 x »  x
A» 2 x »  y ®  y »  x
A» 3 x »  y Ù  y »  z ® x »  z.
                                                
19 On the difference between location and occupation, see Casati and Varzi 1996,
1999.
20 Our axioms for ‘» ‘ are adopted from Smith 1997. They differ slightly from those
given by Chisholm, who takes coincidence to pertain exclusively to boundaries. In par-
ticular, reflexivity and transitivity do not hold unrestrictedly for Chisholm (see his 1984).
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To these axioms we add two postulates to the effect that coinciding entities
have coinciding parts and are closed under arbitrary sums:
A» 4 x £  y Ù  y »  z ®  $ w(w £  z Ù  x »  w)
A» 5 $ y(f y) Ù  " y(f y ®  x »  y) ®  x »  s y(f y).
Thus, in particular, if x coincides with two entities y and z, then it coincides
also with the sum of y and z.
We are finally ready to define Brentanian connection—connection by
fiat boundary. The idea is simply that this form of connection obtains be-
tween two adjacent entities, for example Germany and France, whenever their
fiat boundaries coincide at least in part:
DB*3 C*(x, y) := O(x, y) Ú  $ z$ w(B*(z, x) Ù  B*(w, y) Ù  z »  w).
If x and y overlap then they are both C-connected and C*-connected. The
difference between the two relations comes to light in the case of entities that
do not overlap. If the boundary through which x and y are connected is a
bona fide boundary, i.e., if they are externally C-connected in the sense of
DB4, then this boundary bounds one entity from the inside and the other
from the outside. (See again TB4, which effectively represents the Bolzanian
view of contact.) If, by contrast, the boundary through which x and y are con-
nected is a fiat boundary, i.e., if they are externally C*-connected:
DB*4 EC*(x, y) := C*(x, y) Ù  Ø O(x, y),
then each entity is bounded by its own fiat boundary. It is in this sense that
the head of John is in contact with the rest of John’s body.
3.5. Dependence
At this point we can complete our account of the central intuition that all
boundaries (whether fiat or bona fide) are dependent entities. We have seen
that AB4 and AB*4 do not fully succeed in this respect, and that a predicate
of self-connectedness is needed to rule out trivial hosts. In ordinary topol-
ogy, an entity is said to be self-connected if it does not amount to the sum of
two disconnected parts. In the present context, however, the relevant notion of
21
connection is not ‘C’ (bona fide connection), for we certainly want to say
that John’s body and his undetached head form a connected sum. Rather, we
must rely on the fiat variety of connection, ‘C*’. A self-connected entity is
one all of whose parts are separated at most by fiat:
DB*5 Cn*(x) := " y" z (x=y+z ®  C*(y, z)).
We can then amend AB4 and AB*4 to the following theses affirming, for
connected boundaries, the existence of connected wholes which they are
boundaries for:
AB5 Bd(x) Ù  Cn*(x) ®  $ y$ z(Cn*(y) Ù  B(x, y) Ù  IP(z, y)).
AB*5 Bd*(x) Ù  Cn*(x) ®  $ y$ z(Cn*(y) Ù  B*(x, y) Ù  IP*(z, y)).
Thus, through the notion of self-connectedness, the theory of bona fide
boundaries presupposes the theory of fiat boundaries. This implies, surpris-
ingly, a central role for the fiat world even in matters of bona fide ontology. It
implies also a hitherto unrecognized feature of classical mereotopology, the
formal implications of which have still to be examined.
4. Concluding Remarks
Let us conclude by underlining again the main points of our account. First,
we have argued that the notion of a boundary must play a fundamental role in
a categorial scheme that aims at being both realistic and non-reductionist.
True, from the perspective of the physical sciences ordinary physical objects
are not continuous and they do not have boundaries of the sort countenanced
by common sense. But even if naive boundary talk is deemed inadequate
with respect to the entities of physics, one still needs boundaries when it
comes to the fiat objects grasped in ordinary experience.
Second, we have argued that the basic typology of spatial boundaries
involves an opposition between bona fide (or physical) and fiat boundaries,
the latter being exemplified especially by boundaries induced through human
demarcation. The classical metaphysical problems connected with the notions
of adjacency, contact, separation, and division can be resolved in an intuitive
way by recognizing this bicategorial nature of boundaries. Bona fide
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boundaries yield a notion of contact that is effectively modeled by classical
topology; the analogue of contact involving fiat boundaries calls for a differ-
ent account, based on the intuition that fiat boundaries do not support the
open/closed distinction on which classical topology is based.
Finally, we have seen that mereotopology—topology erected on a mere-
ological basis—is more than a trivial formal variant of point-set topology.
Much mereotopological machinery can be interpreted in standard set-
theoretic terms.21 But the opposition between fiat and bona fide boundaries
cannot be modelled in a natural and intuitive fashion within a topology
erected on a set-theoretic basis.22
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